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Input Subsidy Programs and Commercial Market Development: 
Modeling Fertilizer Use Decisions in a Two-Channel Marketing System 
 
Fertilizer use in sub-Saharan Africa currently stands at 9kgs per cropped hectare 
-- by far the lowest of any developing region.   There is widespread consensus that much 
greater use of fertilizer by African farmers will be required to generate the productivity 
growth needed to reduce poverty.  However, there is considerable debate about exactly 
how to achieve sustainable increases in fertilizer use.  Over the past 30 years, a number of 
different approaches have been attempted to promote fertilizer use in sub-Saharan Africa:  
state subsidized distribution programs, targeted input credit programs, free starter packs, 
interlinked credit-input-crop marketing outgrower arrangements, and “liberalization,” 
whereby private traders are encouraged to develop commercial input marketing networks 
in rural areas, to name a few.   A review of the literature reveals mixed evidence and 
considerable debate about the appropriate roles of government and the private sector in 
sustainably raising small farmers’ use of fertilizer (for reviews, see Crawford, Jayne, and 
Kelly, 2006; Gladwin et al., 2002; and Minot, 2002).   
  One the one hand, there are major concerns about the private sector’s ability to 
serve the needs of small farmers in remote areas and the ability of poor farm households 
to afford fertilizer, even where it is clearly profitable to use it.  Dorward et al (2004) 
contend that state-led input and output marketing policies featured prominently in the 
“green revolutions” successes achieved in Asia in the 1970s and 1980s and that similar 
programs will be needed in Africa.  The recent “Abuja Fertilizer Declaration” released by 
the African Union Member States in June 2006 contends that rapid productivity growth 
in Africa will require the return to large government subsidy programs.     3
  On the other hand, there is great concern that sustainable increases in fertilizer use 
are blocked by a “catch-22” situation in which private traders’ incentives are undermined 
by government fertilizer distribution programs, which may inhibit the development of 
commercial input markets, and then justify the rationale for continued government 
programs (Pletcher, 2000).  In this way, stated policy objectives to encourage the 
development of commercial fertilizer markets may be continuously thwarted by programs 
designed to correct for temporary market failure.  
  The input marketing systems in many developing countries are characterized by 
parallel distribution channels, where commercial traders and government programs 
operate simultaneously.  Realistic empirical analysis aimed at understanding the factors 
influencing farmer use of fertilizer and their implications for policy would presumably 
need to explicitly account for this parallel marketing structure, because effective demand 
in one channel may be affected by the behavior of agents in the other channel.  The 
concept of “crowding out” is important in this regard.  Crowding out in this paper refers 
to the extent to which government operations displace or depress the sales of commercial 
input suppliers.  While concerns with crowding out have been important in debates over 
appropriate input marketing policies in low-income countries, there has been little or no 
attempt, as far as we are aware, to estimate this effect empirically.  
Zambia, in southern Africa, provides an interesting case to examine the 
interactions between government and private input distribution channels and the 
measurement of crowding out.  Government agricultural policy has for the past several 
decades focused on subsidized fertilizer distribution programs to alleviate poverty and 
enhance food security and aggregate economic growth.  Although capacity in agriculture   4
is under-utilized and the growth potential is considered large, agricultural production has 
been consistently low. Annual growth rates achieved between 1993 and 2003 was only 
2.2% which hardly exceeded the population growth rate.  Over 70% of the rural 
population lies below the poverty line.  After legalizing private trade in fertilizer in the 
early 1990s, the Zambian government has resumed large-scale fertilizer subsidy 
programs since 1999 to kick-start productivity growth for small farmers (Jayne et al., 
2003).  Despite government’s efforts, overall fertilizer consumption has expanded slowly 
and only 20% of smallholder farmers used fertilizer in the 2002/2003 crop season 
(Govereh et al., 2006).  
The paper has three primary purposes.  First, we develop a double hurdle 
modeling framework to identify the factors influencing the probability of maize farm 
households acquiring fertilizer from private and government distribution channels as well 
as the amount acquired from each channel.  This modeling framework takes explicit 
account of how government programs affect households’ purchase of fertilizer from 
private channels, and hence allows us to estimate the degree of crowding out.  Second, 
we examine whether fertilizer use patterns among small farmers in Zambia are primarily 
a function of agroecological and market conditions or whether there are larger differences 
within particular zones that are driven by household-specific socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics.  Lastly we identify the potential to increase fertilizer use 
through public policy tools.   
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Previous Research 
  Econometric studies of fertilizer use in Sub-Saharan Africa are limited.  Most 
studies analyzed factors influencing fertilizer adoption using either a probit or logit model 
(Falusi 1974, Green and Ng’ong’ola 1993, Negassa et al. 1997, Kaliba et al., 2000, Isham 
2002, Chirwa 2005).    
Falusi (1974) found that frequency of extension contact and access to credit have 
significant impact on fertilizer adoption in western Nigerian. Green and Ng’ong’ola 
(1993) indicated that the crops grown, farming system, access to credit, off-farm 
employment opportunities, and regular labor are the main factors influencing fertilizer 
adoption in Malawi.  The study by Negassa et al. (1997) revealed that in the Bako area of 
Ethiopia, use of fertilizers is significantly related to provision of credit and the household 
head’s level of education.  Kaliba et al. (2000) presented empirical evidence that 
extension services, rainfall, on-farm field trials, and variety characteristics significantly 
influence fertilizer adoption in the intermediate and lowland zones of Tanzania.  Isham’s 
study (2002) found that the probability of adoption of fertilizer in the Central Plateau 
region of Tanzania is increasing in land under cultivation, cumulative adoption patterns, 
ethnic social affiliations, adoption of improved seeds, credit availability, extension 
services, and average years of residence in the village; whereas in the Plains region, the 
probability is increasing in land under cultivation, ethnic social affiliations and 
consultative norms. Chirwa (2005) found that fertilizer adoption by smallholder maize 
farmers in southern Malawi is associated with education level, plot size, non-farm 
income, gender of the household head, and the distance from input markets.    6
Croppenstedt and Demeke (1996) applied a Heckman model to Ethiopian data 
and found that farmer literacy, access to all-weather roads, oxen ownership, extension 
services, access to banking, and labor availability are important factors influencing 
whether farmers use fertilizer, whereas farm size, previous experience with fertilizer, 
fertilizer supply, liquidity, access to banking and credit, the number of oxen owned, and 
the price ratio of the main crop to the cost of fertilizer are important in explaining the 
quantity of fertilizer consumption. 
Adugna (1997) analyzed factors affecting fertilizer adoption and the intensity of 
fertilizer use in central Ethiopia using a logit model and a simultaneous-equation 
regression model respectively.  His study indicated that extension service, the number of 
oxen owned, access to hired labor, and the size of land holding are strong forces behind 
the farmers’ decision to adopt fertilizer. The intensity of fertilizer use is significantly 
influenced by the number of oxen owned, access to credit, the use of hired labor, 
fertilizer-crop price ratio, crop-fertilizer response, farm size, off-farm income, and the 
distance from asphalted road.  
Nkonya et al. (1997) applied a bootstrapped simultaneous equation Tobit model to 
data from Northern Tanzania and found that the number of hectares planted with 
improved maize seed and farm size are significantly related to the amount of nitrogen 
fertilizer applied per hectare.  
Minot et al. (2000) used a Heckman model to identify the determinants of 
fertilizer use in Benin and Malawi.  Their study revealed that fertilizer use in the two 
countries is closely related to crop mix and access to inputs on credit.    7
Knepper (2002) used a probit model and an ordinary least squares regression 
model respectively to analyze factors affecting adoption of fertilizer and the total quantity 
of fertilizer used by small and medium sized households in Zambia. His study indicated 
that ownership of transportation assets, level of district transportation infrastructure, total 
cropped area, ownership of farming assets, and proximity to a fertilizer depot are 
significantly related to household use of fertilizer; total cropped area, ecological zone 
variable, and provincial location variable have significant impacts on the quantity of 
fertilizer used.  
Using a double-hurdle model, Croppenstedt et al. (2003) found that access to 
credit is a major supply-side constraint to fertilizer adoption in Ethiopia. Household size, 
value-to-cost ratio, and formal education of the farmer are the most significant demand-
side factors influencing adoption and intensity of fertilizer use.    
In Abdoulaye and Sanders (2005)’s study of stepwise decision of fertilization in 
Niger, probit and Tobit models were used to estimate demand functions for organic and 
inorganic fertilizers. They indicated that the price ratio of fertilizer to millet is always a 
highly significant determinant of fertilizer adoption; participation or visits in on-farm 
trials is a principal factor influencing the use of micro-dosage of inorganic fertilizer; the 
relative price of fertilizer to millet is the most important factor in the decision to use 
moderate levels of inorganic fertilizer.  
  While these studies have provided important insights into the factors influencing 
fertilizer use by small farmers, there are several notable problems.  The first is the 
frequent use of explanatory variables that are arguably endogenous (e.g., crop mix, use of 
input credit, labor use).  Failing to deal with the endogeneity problem can lead to biased   8
parameter estimates and potentially misleading implications for policy.  Another major 
limitation of prior studies is the difficulty of controlling for unobserved household 
heterogeneity.  Relevant household variables are almost always missing, such as micro-
variability in soil and agroecological conditions, farmer knowledge and risk attitude, 
which are difficult to measure or hard to obtain.  Time-invariant unobserved effects can 
be controlled for through the use of panel data.  We are unaware of previous longitudinal 
analysis using African data to econometrically study fertilizer use behavior. 
  Third, and particularly relevant for this study, while parallel input marketing 
channels featuring government subsidy programs and private commercial channels are a 
common feature of market structure in sub-Saharan Africa, to our knowledge, no 
previous research has attempted to discern how these channels interact to affect fertilizer 
purchase behavior or to distinguish between the attributes of households acquiring 
fertilizer from each channel.  It is highly likely that household characteristics influencing 
fertilizer use will differ for commercial fertilizer retailers vs. government programs.  
Government programs often attempt to target poor households, while commercial 
fertilizer sales, being a function of effective demand, may be accounted for mainly by 
relatively wealthy and educated farmers.  Moreover, a farmer’s decision to purchase 
fertilizer commercially may greatly depend on whether subsidized fertilizer programs are 
operating in the area.  Failure to account for parallel market structure precludes the 
detection of potential crowding out effects, which may lead to spurious conclusions about 
household-level and geographic factors influencing commercial fertilizer purchase 
decisions.   This paper attempts to overcome these limitations.  
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Econometric Method 
  We use Cragg’s double-hurdle model to analyze the probability of using fertilizer 
and the amount of fertilizer use from each fertilizer-marketing channel.  The double-
hurdle model is chosen because it nests the standard Tobit model and accommodates the 
possibility that the choice between adoption versus non-adoption and the level of 
adoption is determined by two processes, whereas in the Tobit model these decisions are 
determined as a single process.  The Tobit model can be obtained as a special case of the 
double-hurdle model.  The double-hurdle model has a binary adoption equation and a 
level of adoption equation: 
Binary adoption equation:  e X d + = β
*  












Level of adoption equation:  u Z y + = γ
*   













* is a latent variable, d is the corresponding binary variable with d=1 denoting the 
household used fertilizer, and 0 denoting the household did not use fertilizer; X and Z are 
vectors of explanatory variables; β and γ are vectors of parameters; y
* denotes a latent 
variable, y is the corresponding observed level of fertilizer consumption; e follows a 
standard normal distribution, and u has a zero mean homoskedastic normal distribution. 
Estimates of β and γ are obtained running a probit model and a truncated regression 
model respectively.  
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Crowding Out Effect 
Whether there is crowding out effect of government distributing fertilizer on credit can be 
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where ∆ denotes change in the quantity,  Total is the total quantity of fertilizer adopted by 
farmers, Gov is the quantity distributed by government, and Priv is the quantity that 
farmers purchase from private traders.  







































If (i) is found to exist, this means that government distribution is contributing positively 
to private sector sales, such that each additional ton of fertilizer distributed by the 
government generates a more-than-one ton increase in total fertilizer use.  Condition (ii) 
implies that government programs have no effect on the quantity of fertilizer sold by 
private traders, i.e., the crowding out effect is zero.  However, if condition (iii) is found to 
exist, this means that each additional ton of fertilizer distributed by government depresses 
sales by private traders and hence total fertilizer use rises by less than one ton.  Condition 
(iii) is the mathematical expression of the crowding out effect.  
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Approach  
To determine the extent of government crowding out of private fertilizer sales, we 
proceed as follows.  Based on the estimates of the household-level probit model for the 
adoption of fertilizer from private channel and truncated regression model for the amount 
of fertilizer purchased from private channel, we examine whether the estimates of the 
coefficients – α and β in the probit model and truncated regression model respectively – 
on the government program variable, i.e., the amount of fertilizer distributed by 
government in a rural Standard Enumeration Area (SEA) where the household belongs 
divided by the total number of households in that area, are statistically significant or not. 
Statistically insignificant coefficient estimates of both α and β, while not necessarily 
indicating an absence of crowding out, are considered here to support condition (ii) 
above.   
Except for the case that both α and β are statistically insignificant, we can divide 
the other possible outcomes of α and β into four categories: (a) both are statistically 
significant and negative; (b) both are statistically significant and positive; (c) both are 
statistically significant but have opposite signs; (d) only one of the two estimates is 
statistically significant. We discuss each below with a focus on the possible outcome (a). 
Statistically significant and negative coefficient estimates is evidence of crowding 
out (condition iii) and we need to further quantify this effect. The coefficient estimates α 
and β from probit model and truncated regression model, if all negative, provide 
information on the ceteris paribus marginal effect of an increase in the quantity of 
fertilizer distributed by government in a rural SEA on decrease in the probability of a 
household purchasing fertilizer from private sector and reduction in the quantity of   12
fertilizer purchased by a household from the private sector, respectively. To obtain the 
effect of an increase in quantity of fertilizer distributed by government on change in the 
total quantity of fertilizer procured from private sector in a particular rural area, we need 
to further obtain information about that area on the total number of farm households, the 
number of households purchasing fertilizer from private sector, and the average quantity 
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                                                                                       (1) 
where  ni  is that total number of farm households in area i, n'i is the number of 
households purchasing fertilizer from private sector in area i, qi is the average quantity 
purchased from private sector by a household in area i, α is the coefficient estimate from 
probit model, and  β is the coefficient estimate from truncated regression model. There 
are two sources of change in the total quantity of fertilizer purchased from private sector 
in a given area caused by government distributing additional amount of fertilizer in that 
area: one from change in the number of households purchasing from private sector and 
the other from change in the quantity purchased from private sector by those households 
who still purchase from private sector.  
The right hand side of equation (1) which is comprised of two parts shows 
quantity change from these two sources. The first part gives estimate of the change in the 
quantity purchased from private sector due to some households no longer buying from 
private sector as α, being negative, is the estimate of decrease in the percentage of 
households buying from private sector associated with a marginal increase in the quantity 
distributed by government measured in terms of kilogram per farm household in the rural 
area where the household is located. The second part gives estimate of the change in the   13
quantity procured from private sector caused by households still buying from private 
sector but buying less as β, being negative, is the estimate of decrease in the quantity 
purchased by a household from private sector associated with a marginal increase in the 
quantity distributed by government per household. Adding 1 to this estimate generates 
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Clearly area-specific crowding out effect will differ as ni, n'i and qi vary across areas. If 










, i.e., there will be no crowding out in area i because no 
household purchase from private sector in that area. 
We can further conduct simulation analysis and measure the aggregate quantity 
change of fertilizer procured from the private sector when government distributes 
additional amount of fertilizer in areas where the private sector operates.  The formula for 






































































                 (3)                                 
where ∆Priv is the aggregate quantity change of fertilizer procured from private sector, 
(∆Gov)i is the quantity change of fertilizer distributed by government in area i,  and k is 
the total number of areas that are targeted by the government program . The result 
depends on which and how many SEAs the government operates in and to what extent 
government increases the volumes of fertilizer it distributes in these areas.   14
If the coefficient estimates α and β are statistically significant and positive,   
condition (i) is satisfied and thus there is evidence that government input distribution 
programs enhances the quantity of fertilizer distributed by private sector and we can 
measure this effect using the same method as described above for estimating the 
crowding out effect by plugging the estimates in equations (1) ~ (3).  
Equations (1) ~ (3) can also be used to determine whether there is crowding out or 
crowding in effect and the magnitude of the effect if both α and β are statistically 
significant but have opposite signs. Moreover, when only one of the two coefficient 
estimates, either α or β, is statistically significant, the corresponding calculation is 
simplified by plugging in zero for α or β in these equations. 
 
Data 
The source of the household-level panel data used in this study is the 1999/2000 Post 
Harvest Survey (PHS), the linked Supplementary Survey to the 1999/2000 PHS, and the 
2003/04 Supplementary PHS Survey.  These panel surveys tracking 6,922 households 
were conducted by the Central Statistical Office and Ministry of Agriculture, Food and 
Fisheries in Zambia.  
The PHS is a nationally representative annual survey of small and medium scale 
agricultural households in Zambia.  Sample weights were derived to scale-up results to 
the national level, and we use weighted regression techniques in our estimation.  The 
PHS survey includes information on crop and livestock production and management as 
well as households’ socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. Except two entirely 
urban districts (Lusaka Urban and Ndola Urban), all the other 70 districts are represented   15
in the survey. A stratified three-stage sampling design was used for the survey, i.e., at the 
first stage, Census Supervisory Areas (CSAs) were selected with probability proportional 
to size (PPS) within each district, where size is measured according to the total number of 
households in the CSA; next, within each sample CSA, generally one Standard 
Enumeration Area (SEA) was selected with PPS; at the last stage, a sample of households 
were selected from a listing of households stratified by size within each sample SEA 
(Megill 2005). 
The 1999/2000 PHS Supplemental Survey which was conducted in 2001 
interviewed the same households in the 1999/2000 PHS and collected supplemental 
information based on the specific survey data needs of the Food Security Research 
Project for its various research activities. In 2004, the Second Supplemental Survey was 
conducted covering the same households in the first supplemental survey.  
Information on the operation of government fertilizer programs was obtained by 
the Ministry of Agriculture.  In the crop seasons covered by the two surveys, 1999/2000 
and 2002/2003, the government was distributing fertilizer to farmers at roughly 50% of 
the full retail cost.  Hence, if the government were distributing fertilizer in a particular 
area, a farmer who would have otherwise purchased fertilizer at full price from a private 
dealer may have perceived major advantage to trying to acquire her fertilizer needs from 
the government program instead.  
 
Explanatory Variables 
Economic theory indicates that farmers’ decisions of whether to procure and how much 
to procure fertilizer from private suppliers are determined by the costs of procurement   16
and the perceived benefits from fertilizer use.  In the literature, factors identified to 
influence fertilizer demand by small-scale farmers in sub-Saharan Africa may be 
categorized into three groups: household socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics, market access variables, and agro-ecological variables. We discuss each 
below. 
  Household socio-economic and demographic characteristics: We examine the 
importance of a wide range of household-level variables in the models of fertilizer use 
from each channel – farm size, household wealth, the sex, age and education of the 
household head, the number of adult males, adult females, and children (proxies for 
household labor supply), whether the household head, spouse, or other adult has died 
during the past three years of each survey period (i.e., mortality shocks), and other 
household-specific variables that might influence the households’ access to subsidized 
fertilizer through government programs (e.g., whether a household member is a civil 
servant or related to the local chief in the area).  
Ceteris Paribus, we expect asset value, cropland size, education, number of male 
adults, and number of female adults to positively influence fertilizer purchase from 
private channel. Whether and how age and sex of the household head affect fertilizer 
demand is unclear due to the lack of straightforward theory and inconclusive findings in 
the literature.  We would expect mortality shocks to adversely affect household 
purchasing power and therefore ability to purchase fertilizer commercially, although 
government distribution criteria may include targeting to AIDS-affected and other types 
of vulnerable households.    17
We also include these variables in the model of fertilizer use from government 
channel to investigate whether and how these variables, especially household economic 
status, affect the probability of a household receiving fertilizer from government and the 
amount received.  
Whether a household acquires subsidized fertilizer from the government channel 
in Zambia is generally not determined by the household.  Factors influencing fertilizer 
procurement from government channel are examined as an investigation of the criteria 
used by government to distribute fertilizer to targeted beneficiaries.  We use the same set 
of household-level variables in the government fertilizer procurement models.  
  Market access variables:  We include distance of the household to the main road 
and distance to the district town in the models of fertilizer use from each channel, and 
include another important variable, government fertilizer program variable measured by 
the quantity of fertilizer distributed by government divided by the total number of farm 
households in the area where the household is located as discussed in the Approach 
section, in the model of fertilizer use from private channel.
1  Households that are more 
distant to the main road or district town leads to higher transportation cost of fertilizer 
procurement and lower output prices, and therefore it is expected that these variables will 
be inversely related to a household’s decision to purchase fertilizer from private channels.  
In Zambia, government fertilizer programs ostensibly aim to distribute fertilizer to 
households in remote areas where the private sector is assumed not to operate; if this is 
the case, we would expect the distance variables to be positively related to household’s 
acquisition of government fertilizer.     18
  Agro-ecological variables:  Soil type and agro-zone variables are included in the 
models of fertilizer use from each channel. We expect the incentives for procuring 
fertilizer from private channel to be higher for certain soil types and agro-zones because 
of better maize yield response to fertilizer use. In other words, marginal product of 
fertilizer is expected to differ across soil types and agro-zones, thus we also expect 
fertilizer demand to differ accordingly. The significance of these agro-ecological factors 
in government targeting of fertilizer is also examined.  
Table 1 shows the dependent and explanatory variables used in this paper and 
their definition.   19
Table 1. Definition of Variables 
Variables                                                                                Definition 
Dependent variables 
USEBSL_G  If the household used basal fertilizer from government 
channel or not (Yes=1)  
USEBSL_P  If the household used basal fertilizer from  
                                                               private channel or not (Yes=1) 
             QBSL_G               Total basal fertilizer use amount in kilogram from  
                                                               government channel for the household                                                     
             QBSL_P               Total basal fertilizer use amount in kilogram from  
                                                                private channel for the household 
Explanatory variables 
       Household socio-economic and demographic characteristics 
  ASSET                                        Asset value including farm equipment,  
 transportation equipment, and livestock value in Kwacha 
  CROPLAND               Size of cropland owned by the household in hectare 
  CROPLAND2               Square term of the variable cropland 
             AGE                  Age of the household head 
  FEMALEHH               If the household head is a female or not (Yes=1) 
  EDUC                 Education of the household head 
  N_MALE               Number of male adults 
  N_FEMALE               Number of female adults 
  N_KIDS               Number of kids (age less than 15) 
             HEAD_D               Indicates if the head of the household deceased 
           within the last three years (Yes=1) 
             SPOUSE_D               Indicates if the spouse of the household head  
                                                               deceased within the last three years (Yes=1) 
  OTHER_D               Indicates if any other adult member deceased within 
                                                               the last three yeas (Yes=1) 
  CSERVANT                              If the household has a member who is a civil servant 
                                                               or not (Yes=1) 
  HMANR_HH                          If the household head is related to the village headman                                        
                                                               or not (Yes=1) 
  HMANR_SP               If the spouse of the household head is related to the  
                                                               Village headman or not (Yes=1) 
       Market access variables  
  MAINROAD                             Distance to the main road in km 
  DISTTOWN                              Distance to the district town in km 
  BSL_GOV                                Quantity in kilogram of basal fertilizer distributed by  
                                                              government divided by the number of farm households in    
                                                              the area where the household is located                                                                 
           Agro-ecological variables 
ZONEIIa                                   Indicates if the district belongs to agro-zone IIa  
                                                              (Yes=1)   
             ZONEIIb                                   Indicates if the district belongs to agro-zone IIb 
                                                              (Yes=1) 
  ZONEIII                                   Indicates if the district belongs to agro-zone III 
                                                              (Yes=1)   
AF                Indicates if the soil type is acrisols or ferrasols 
                                                              (Yes=1)   20
AL                Indicates if the soil type is alisols or lixisols or 
                                                 luvisols (Yes=1) 
HG                                           Indicates if the soil type is histosols or gleysols  
                                                 (Yes=1) 
FV                                            Indicates if the soil type is fluvisols or vertisols   
                                                 (Yes=1) 
LR                                            Indicates if the soil type is leptosols or regosols 




Findings   
Before presenting the econometric results, we first provide some summary statistics for 
all variables in Table 1. Tables 2 and 3 show the percentages of households using basal 
fertilizer
2 and the average quantities acquired by fertilizer users from government and 
private channels. Less than 20% of households used fertilizer from either channel for 
each survey period although there is a slight increase over the survey interval in the 
percentage of households using fertilizer from each channel. The average amount of 
fertilizer used among adopters from government channel is lower in 2002/2003 than 
1999/2000 while no significant differences were found for fertilizer users from private 
channel.  
Table 2. Basal Fertilizer Use from Government Channel  
                                1999/2000         2002/2003               
Households using fertilizer (%)                                          9.68                                     13.91                  
                                                                                            (0.61)                                   (0.71) 
Average quantity used among users (kilogram)                 171.32                                  121.32 
                                                                                            (9.3)                                     (6.92) 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
                                           
Table 3. Basal Fertilizer Use from Private Channel  
                                1999/2000         2002/2003               
Households using fertilizer (%)                                          13.61                                   15.26                  
                                                                                            (0.66)                                   (0.7) 
Average quantity used among users (kilogram)                 121.67                                 120.56 
                                                                                            (6.87)                                   (6.36) 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses.   21
Table 4 gives weighted mean estimates of explanatory variables for users of basal 
fertilizer from alternative channels and non-users for each survey period. 
Table 4. Users of Basal Fertilizer from Alternative Channels and Non-users  
Explanatory                  1999/2000                         2002/2003 
Variables          Gov.          Private          Non-users            Gov.          Private         Non-users 
ASSET                  1,537,234      1,254,489        534,535            1,370,390   1,419,039       572,434   
      (137,305)       (114,432)         (27,914)          (124,558)     (147,017)       (32,045) 
CROPLAND          2.7        2.1    1.5               2.3               2.1                  1.5 
                     (0.1)          (0.1)             (0.03)                 (0.1)             (0.1)              (0.03) 
AGE           45.5               44.2    43.5              47.6             44.7                  47 
                                  (1)                 (0.8)               (0.4)                 (0.8)             (0.7)                (0.4) 
FEMALEHH (%)      7.9                  15.1     22              16.7             13.7                22.7 
                                  (1.6)             (1.9)                 (1)                     (2)               (1.7)                 (1) 
EDUC            6.6                   5.8      4.7    5.8                6.1                  4.4 
                      (0.3)     (0.2)                (0.1)                 (0.2)             (0.2)                (0.1) 
N_MALE                    2                    2       1      2                  2                      2 
                                 (0.1)            (0.1)              (0.02)                 (0.7)            (0.06)              (0.03) 
N_FEMALE               2                2       1      2                  2                2 
                                 (0.1)              (0.1)              (0.02)                 (0.1)             (0.1)                (0.02) 
N_KIDS          4         4      3      3                  2            2 
                                (0.2)              (0.1)                (0.1)                   (0.1)             (0.1)               (0.04) 
HEAD_D(%)             0      0.3    0.1    4.0         3.7          3.6 
                                 (0)                (0.3)                (0.1)                    (1)          (1)                  (0.5) 
SPOUSE_D(%)        1.2                2.1                   1.4                     2.7                1.3                    1.8 
                                 (0.6)             (0.8)    (0.3)                  (1)                (0.5)                (0.3) 
OTHER_D(%)         11.5        7.7    9.2    9.7               10.5                   11.1 
          (2.1)              (1.4)                (0.7)                  (1.5)              (1.6)                (0.8) 
CSERVANT(%)         3      3.6     1     3.3                 3           1 
      (0.9)               (1)                  (0.2)                   (0.8)             (0.9)                (0.2) 
HMANR_HH(%)      28.2              26.6    35.5    28.7              20.6                 37.4 
                                 (3.1)             (2.4)                (1.1)                   (2.5)               (2)                  (1.2) 
HMANR_SP(%)        8                  5.5    7.7    7.9                   6           7.7 
                                 (2)                (1.1)                (0.6)                  (1.6)               (1.1)                (0.7)  
MAINROAD        20.5      26.4    25.6    20                 24.8                  26.3 
                                (1.9)              (2.1)                 (0.9)                  (1.5)              (1.9)                (0.9)                                 
DISTTOWN        28.8      28.6    34.9              29.8               28.4        35.2 
                                (1)                 (0.9)    (0.5)               (1)                (0.8)                (0.5) 
ZONEIIa (%)        79      73.3    53.6    59.6              67.7        56.4 
                               (2.5)               (2.2)                 (1.2)                  (2.6)              (2.3)                (1.2) 
ZONEIIb (%)        0.2      1.2    14.8    7.1                 0.8        14.6 
                               (0.2)              (0.5)                  (0.9)                 (1.4)               (0.5)                (0.9) 
ZONEIII (%)       16.6    23.8    23.2    29                 27.4        20.6 
                               (2.2)                (2)                   (0.9)                 (2.3)               (2.1)                (0.9) 
AF (%)        43.4    54.5    32.1    45.3              45.3                  32.8 
                               (3.3)              (2.6)                  (1.1)                  (2.7)              (2.5)                (1.2) 
AL (%)         17             13.5    11.7    12.9              13.3             12 
                               (2.5)               (1.7)                  (0.8)                   (2)                (1.6)               (0.9) 
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HG (%)        1.4      1.8     2.3     2.5                1.5         2.2 
                              (0.8)               (0.6)                  (0.4)                  (0.8)              (0.6)                (0.4)  
FV (%)                   4.6      2.9     4.2     3.2                5.2             4 
                              (1.4)               (0.8)                  (0.4)                  (0.9)              (1.1)                (0.5) 
LR (%)                   21.1    15.3      15     17                  20        14.5 
                              (2.7)               (1.9)                   (0.9)                  (2.1)             (2.1)                (0.9) 
 
Note: Gov. denotes government channel and Private denotes private channel. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. 
 
Table 5 shows the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of BSL_G_AREA for 
SEAs in which government distributed fertilizer. 
Table 5. Percentiles of BSL_GOV for SEAs in which Government Distributed Fertilizer 
(kilogram) 
Percentiles               1999/2000                                    2002/2003               
10%                                              3.7                                                3.4 
25%                                             10.3                                               7.1 
50%                                             21.4                                              16.7 
75%                                             43.8                                              31.8 
90%                                             87.5                                              58.7 
 
  Scatterplots of SEA-level total volume of fertilizer acquired from private retailers 
versus from government for each survey period are presented in Figures 1 and 2. These 
graphs show that government programs distributed fertilizer in many areas where private 
sector also operated although there was only one channel distributing fertilizer in some 
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Figure 1. SEA-level total quantity of fertilizer acquired from private traders versus 
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Figure 2. SEA-level total quantity of fertilizer acquired from private traders versus 
from the government, 2002/2003 
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Interestingly there are several notable differences between fertilizer users and 
non-users that are common to both channels for each period shown in Table 5. On 
average, households acquiring fertilizer from either private or government channels have 
larger farms, greater asset value, higher education levels of the household head, and are 
less likely to be female-headed, have a civil servant member, and closer to the district 
town, which are supported by adjusted Wald-test results.   
For 1999/2000, test results suggest that on average, government fertilizer users 
have larger cropland holding size, fewer percentage of households being female-headed, 
household head with a higher level of education, fewer percentage of households in Zone 
IIb or 4, and fewer percentage having soil types acrisols and ferrasols (AF) than private 
channel fertilizer users. The other variables are not significantly different. For 2002/2003, 
except for the household head being older and more likely related to the village headman, 
fewer percentage of households in Zone IIa, and larger percentage in Zone IIb, no other 
significant differences were found between fertilizer adopters from government channel 
and from private channel.  
The finding that government fertilizer recipients have significantly higher farm 
sizes and asset levels, and are also closer to main roads and district towns than non-users, 
indicate that government is not generally targeting poorer households that have relatively 
low purchasing power or those in remote areas. Results also suggest some potential for 
crowding out since the attributes of households purchasing fertilizer from private channel 
and government appear to be similar in many respects. However, these bivariate results 
do not control for other factors, and hence we move to the econometric findings.  
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Fertilizer Adoption from Government Channel 
Probit estimates of the models for fertilizer adoption from government channel are 
presented in Table 6.  To examine the robustness of the findings, we present probit 
estimates for the pooled 1999/2000 and 2002/2003 data, random effects, and fixed 
effects.    26
Table 6. Probit Estimates of Fertilizer Adoption from Government Channel Models 
                                                                  
Variables                 Pooled                     Random effects             Fixed effects 
ASSET                6.41×10
-9** *                              6.51×10
-9***                     8.05×10
-9* 
                       (2.01×10
-9)                   (9.07×10
-10)                 (4.59×10
-9) 
CROPLAND                        0.017
***               0.017
***                                 _ 
                                (0.002)                          (0.0015) 
AGE                                                0.0008
**              0.0008
***                         -0.001
* 
                                                                 (0.0003)                        (0.0003)                          (0.0006)   
FEMALEHH             -0.013               -0.014                              0.06   
                                                                 (0.012)                           (0.012)                            (0.04)   
EDUC                   0.008
***               0.008
***               0.001 
                                                         (0.001)                          (0.001)                           (0.003)                        
N_MALE                 0.007
*                0.007
**               -0.007   
                                                                (0.004)                          (0.003)                           (0.008) 
N_FEMALE                         0.007                0.007
*               -0.001   
                                                                 (0.005)                          (0.004)                           (0.008) 
N_KIDS    0.004
*                           0.004
**               -0.009
*** 
                                                                (0.002)                          (0.0017)                          (0.003)   
HEAD_D                  0.04                0.04                           -0.013 
                                                                 (0.04)                             (0.03)                              (0.04) 
SPOUSE_D                         0.02                0.01                                 -0.01 
                                                                 (0.03)                (0.03)                              (0.04) 
OTHER_D                   -0.01               -0.01                -0.002 
          (0.01)                            (0.01)                               (0.02) 
CSERVANT                          0.04                0.04
*                               0.0002 
                                                                 (0.03)                            (0.02)                               (0.05) 
HMANR_HH                       0.002                0.002                                _   
(0.01)                            (0.008)  
HMANR_SP                         0.001                0.001                                _   
                                                                 (0.02)                            (0.01)                    
MAINROAD     - 0 . 0 0 0 4
***             -0.0004
***                   _              
                                                                 (0.0001)                        (0.0001)                   
DISTTOWN                  -0.0007
***             -0.0007
***        _     
                                                                (0.0002)              (0.0002)                              
ZONEIIa       0.05
***                0.06
***          _ 
                                                                 (0.02)                             (0.02)                        
ZONEIIb         0.001                0.001                     _ 
                                                                 (0.03)                            (0.02)                              
ZONEIII       0.05
**                               0.05
**                     _ 
                                                                 (0.02)                             (0.02)                 
AF       0 . 0 5
***                0.05
***                         _ 
                                                                 (0.01)                             (0.01)           
AL        0 . 0 3
*                0.03
**              _ 
                                                                 (0.02)                             (0.01)            
HG          0.03      0.03                     _       
                                                                 (0.04)                             (0.03)                           
FV                      -0.005                -0.005          _  
                                                                 (0.02)                             (0.02)                         
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LR        0 . 0 7
***        0 . 0 6
***                    _ 
                                                                 (0.02)                                (0.01)                       
YEAR2002     0.04
***       0.04
***                    _   
                                                                 (0.009)                              (0.009)   
Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Estimated coefficients are marginal changes in 




***) significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Among the variables describing household socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics, asset value, cropland holding size, age and education of the household 
head, number of male adults, and number of kids are statistically significant and all 
positively affect a household’s probability to receive government fertilizer in the pooled 
and random effects models.  In addition, number of female adults and the household 
having a civil servant are also significant factors and positively associated with the 
probability in the random effects model. In the fixed effects model, asset value positively 
affects the probability while age of the household head and number of kids have negative 
effects. Other time-invariant variables drop out from the fixed effects model. According 
to the estimates from the three models, the probability of receiving government fertilizer 
is approximately 6 to 8 percentage points higher for households with 10,000,000 Kwacha 
(roughly US$2000) increase in asset value. Each additional year of schooling of the 
household head is associated with a 0.8 percentage point higher chance of procuring 
government fertilizer according to the estimates from pooled and random effects models.  
  The two market access variables, distance to the main road and distance to the 
district town are both statistically significant and negative in the pooled and random 
effects models, indicating that government is more likely to distribute fertilizer to 
households closer to towns and main roads, and not in remote areas as is its official 
mandate. The distance variables are constant over time so coefficients cannot be   28
estimated from fixed effects model. Holding other factors constant, 10 kilometers farther 
away from the main road or district town decreases the probability by 0.4 and 0.7 
percentage points respectively. 
  The probability of households receiving fertilizer from government appears to be 
highly correlated with certain agro-ecological variables and soil types, as shown in the 
pooled and random effects estimates. These particular zones and soil types are relatively 
suitable for maize production in Zambia. All else equal, the probability of receiving 
government fertilizer is approximately 5% higher in Zone IIa or 4 than in Zone I or 3.  
  The trend variable YEAR2002 is defined as equal to 1 for 2002/2003 and 0 for 
1999/2000. It is statistically significant and positively influences the probability. Ceteris 
Paribus, a household is approximately 4 percentage points more likely to receive 
government fertilizer in 2002/2003 than in 1999/2000. This corresponds closely to the 
bivariate results in Table 2 showing that the percentage of household receiving fertilizer 
from the government rose from about 10 percent to 14 percent over the survey interval.  
 
Fertilizer Adoption from Private Channel 
 




   29
Table 7. Probit Estimates of Fertilizer Adoption from Private Channel Models 
                                                                  
Variables                 Pooled                   Random effects               Fixed effects 
ASSET                1.18×10
-8** *                              1.2×10
-8***                       3.72×10
-9 
                       (2.36×10
-9)                   (9.95×10
-10)                 (4.33×10
-9) 
CROPLAND                        0.01
***                0.01
***                                 _ 
                                (0.003)                          (0.001) 
AGE                                                -0.0002               -0.0002                         -0.001
* 
                                                                 (0.0004)                        (0.0003)                          (0.0006)   
FEMALEHH             -0.018               -0.02
*                              0.08
**  
                                                                 (0.012)                           (0.011)                            (0.03)   
EDUC                   0.007
***               0.007
***               0.005
* 
                                                         (0.001)                          (0.001)                           (0.003)                        
N_MALE                   0.002                0.002               -0.009   
                                                                (0.005)                          (0.003)                           (0.008) 
N_FEMALE                         0.008                0.008
**                0.003   
                                                                 (0.005)                          (0.004)                           (0.008) 
N_KIDS        0.0004                           0.0004               -0.005
* 
                                                                (0.002)                          (0.002)                            (0.003)   
HEAD_D                  0.04                0.03                           -0.05 
                                                                 (0.05)                             (0.03)                              (0.04) 
SPOUSE_D                         -0.003                -0.003                               0.05 
                                                                 (0.03)                (0.03)                              (0.04) 
OTHER_D                   -0.01               -0.01                 0.03 
          (0.02)                            (0.01)                               (0.02) 
CSERVANT                          0.07
*                0.06
**                               0.05 
                                                                 (0.04)                            (0.03)                               (0.06) 
HMANR_HH                      -0.03
**                -0.03
***                                _   
(0.01)                            (0.01)  
HMANR_SP                       -0.03
**                -0.04
**                                _   
                                                                 (0.01)                             (0.015)                    
MAINROAD        0.0001                  0.0001                                _              
                                                                 (0.0001)                         (0.0001)                   
DISTTOWN                  -0.001
***               -0.001
***                     _     
                                                                (0.0002)     (0.0002)                              
BSL_GOV                                                9.3×10
-5                          9.4×10
-5                       -0.0005
** 
                                                                 (0.0001)                          (0.0001)                      (0.0002) 
ZONEIIa       0.09
***                  0.1
***          _ 
                                                                 (0.02)                               (0.02)                        
ZONEIIb                    -0.07
**      -0.08
**                    _ 
                                                                 (0.025)                             (0.034)                              
ZONEIII       0.12
***      0 . 1
***                     _ 
                                                                 (0.04)                               (0.02)                 
AF       0 . 0 7
***        0 . 0 6
***                        _ 
                                                                 (0.01)                                (0.01)           
AL        0 . 0 3
*                   0.03
**             _ 
                                                                 (0.02)                                (0.014)            
HG          -0.006        -0.006                    _       
                                                                 (0.03)                                (0.025)                           
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FV                      0.03        0.027          _  
                                                                 (0.03)                                (0.02)                         
LR        0 . 0 7
***        0 . 0 6
***                    _ 
                                                                 (0.02)                                (0.01)                       
YEAR2002     0.01        0.01         _   
                                                                 (0.01)                               (0.01)  
Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Estimated coefficients are marginal changes in 




***) significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
The probability of purchasing fertilizer from private retailers, in both the pooled 
and random effects models, is positively correlated with the following household 
characteristics: household wealth (assets), farm size (cropland), education of the 
household head, and households having a civil servant member. The number of female 
adults is also positively associated with this probability in the random effects model 
while the household head being a female is negatively associated with this probability.  In 
contrast to the government fertilizer adoption model, the age of the household head and 
number of male adults and kids are no longer significant, but household head and spouse 
of household head being related to the headman of the village become significant and 
have negative effects in the pooled and random effects models. This result is not 
surprising because relatively large percentage of households among non-users of private 
channel fertilizer reported the household head and spouse being related to the headman. 
The effect of having a civil servant in the household is positive with the probability of 
purchasing fertilizer about 6 percentage points higher according to the pooled and 
random effects estimates.  In the fixed effects model, age of the household head and 
number of kids are negatively associated with the probability of purchasing fertilizer, 
while household head being a female and educational attainment of the household head 
are positively associated with purchasing fertilizer from private retailers.    31
  As in the government channel models, the distance to the district town is inversely 
and significantly related to the probability of purchasing fertilizer from a private dealer. 
Ceteris paribus an additional 10 kilometers farther away form the district town lowers the 
probability of purchasing fertilizer from private dealers by around 1 percentage point. 
   The coefficient estimate on BSL_GOV indicates the impact of government 
fertilizer programs on the probability of purchasing fertilizer from private retailers. In the 
fixed effects model the relationship is statistically significant. Fixed effects model is 
likely to give the most accurate estimate among the three models because it controls for 
unobserved time-invariant variables that may be correlated with the spatial pattern of 
government distribution programs while the other two estimation procedures do not. 
According to the fixed effects estimate, the probability of a household procuring fertilizer 
from a private retailer declines by approximately 5 percentage points if the quantity 
distributed by government in the area (SEA) is increased by 100 kilograms per farm 
household.  
Among statistically significant agro-ecological variables, only Zone IIb has a 
negative effect; Zone IIa, Zone III, soil type AF (acrisols or ferrasols), AL (alisols or 
lixisols or luvisols) and LR (leptosols or regosols) have positive effects. The probability 
of purchasing private channel fertilizer is around 10% higher in Zone IIa and Zone III 
than in Zone I, and around 8% lower in Zone IIb than in Zone I.  
 
Quantity Acquired from Government Channel     
Estimation results of the truncated regression models for fertilizer use amount from 
government channel are presented in Table 8.   32
Table 8. Truncated Regression Estimates of Fertilizer Use Amount from 
Government Channel Models 
                                                                  
Variables                 Pooled                     Random effects             Fixed effects 
ASSET                2.65×10
-6**                              3.67×10
-6***                     2.71×10
-6 
                       (1.1×10
-6)                    (1.28×10
-6)                 (4.57×10
-6) 
CROPLAND                        15.61
***               15.46
***                           _ 
                                (5.87)                            (3.12) 
CROPLAND2                                           -0.59
*                                            -0.43
**                                            _ 
                                                                 (0.32)                             (0.17) 
AGE                                                0.43                      0.49                               0.05
 
                                                                 (0.28)                            (0.3)                             (0.47)   
FEMALEHH             -50.88
**              -29.22
*                          -7.33   
                                                                 (24.45)                           (15.66)                          (16.6)   
EDUC                      1.18                1.37               1.64 
                                                         (0.9)                              (0.99)                             (1.60)                        
N_MALE                   -2.69                -3.62                          8.49   
                                                                (3.24)                           (3.36)                            (6.41) 
N_FEMALE                        6.63
*                7.44
**               -5.21   
                                                                 (3.49)                            (3.49)                             (7.16) 
N_KIDS    2.93
*                           4.03
**               -3.83
* 
                                                                (1.63)                            (1.79)                             (2.08)   
HEAD_D                  40.55                33.44                           61.13
** 
                                                                 (26.78)                           (32.22)                           (27.47) 
SPOUSE_D                         -1.13                -1.15                               18.16 
                                                                 (18.85)                (23.34)                           (24.73) 
OTHER_D                 -27.38
**               -34.1
**                -30.16
** 
          (13.55)                           (14.24)                           (14.78) 
CSERVANT                          12.8                 13.57                              3.35 
                                                                 (12.4)                             (21.11)                            (20.38) 
HMANR_HH                       -0.11                -4.08                                _   
(8.8)                               (8.77)  
HMANR_SP                         7.69                 9.18                                _   
                                                                 (11.34)                            (13.23)                    
MAINROAD        -0.15                             -0.18                                _              
                                                                 (0.13)                               (0.15)                   
DISTTOWN                  -0.32   
                            -0.34                     _     
                                                                (0.23)       (0.23)                               
ZONEIIa                   102.62
**                            -5.66          _ 
                                                                 (50.01)                            (20.52)                        
ZONEIIb       -27.31      -134.83
***                   _ 
                                                                 (43.08)                             (48.99)                              
ZONEIII       9 3 . 6 5
**      -16.87                    _ 
                                                                 (47.91)                              (22.82)                 
AF           1.1        2.62                         _ 
                                                                 (11.32)                              (11.99)           
AL           8.74                   12.25              _ 
                                                                 (14.14)                              (13.83)            
HG          -52.87        -59.23                    _       
                                                                 (36.51)                              (40.88)                             33
FV                      -39.59        -46.33
**        _  
                                                                 (25.3)                                (23.6)                         
LR        -10.82 
         -9.74                     _ 
                                                                 (13.66)                              (14.17)                       
YEAR2002     -16.4
*       -16.7
*          _   
                                                                 (9)                                     (8.56) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Estimated coefficients are marginal effects taking 




***) significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
  Table 8 shows that asset value, cropland holding size, household head being a 
female, number of female adults, number of kids, death of other adult member, and the 
trend variable are statistically significant in both pooled and random effects models.  The 
positive sign on cropland and negative sign on the square term of cropland indicates that 
the amount of fertilizer acquired from the government increases with farm size, but at a 
decreasing rate. One additional female adult member is associated with about 7 kilograms 
(kgs) more fertilizer and one additional kid about 3 kgs to 4 kgs more fertilizer; female-
headed household receive around 30 kgs to 50kgs less fertilizer than male-headed 
household and household obtain approximately 16 kgs less fertilizer in the second survey 
period than in the survey period according to the estimates from pooled and random fixed 
effects models. In the fixed effects model, death of household head has a positive effect 
while number of kids and death of other adult member have negative effects.  
 
Quantity Acquired from Private Channel   
 
Table 9 presents estimation results of the truncated regression models for fertilizer use 
amount from private channel.   34
Table 9. Truncated Regression Estimates of Fertilizer Use Amount from Private 
Channel Models 
                                                                  
Variables                 Pooled                     Random effects             Fixed effects 
ASSET                1.76×10
-6***                              2.36×10
-6***                     3.76×10
-6** 
                       (4.61×10
-7)                    (6.97×10
-7)                 (1.9×10
-6) 
CROPLAND                        22.33
***               26.76
***                           _ 
                                (7.67)                            (3.74) 
CROPLAND2                                           -0.9
**                                            -0.93
***                                            _ 
                                                                 (0.36)                             (0.23) 
AGE                                                -0.02                     -0.001                             0.31
 
                                                                 (0.17)                            (0.23)                            (0.44)   
FEMALEHH             -8.45               -7.67                             -3.82   
                                                                 (9.15)                             (10.12)                          (23.72)   
EDUC                      0.57                 0.65              -0.8 
                                                         (0.80)                             (0.81)                           (2.06)                        
N_MALE                   -2.26                -2.84                          1.18   
                                                                (2.39)                           (2.69)                            (5.38) 
N_FEMALE                         3.16                3.44               5.91   
                                                                 (2.31)                             (2.88)                            (5.34) 
N_KIDS    3.08
**                           3.55
***              -1.94
 
                                                                (1.21)                             (1.32)                            (2.13)   
HEAD_D                -59.29
*                19.33                         -42.09
 
                                                                 (35.24)                           (22.84)                          (48.21) 
SPOUSE_D                         -24.63                -30.97                           -7.88 
                                                                 (18.85)                (26.95)                          (17.5) 
OTHER_D                   -2.18                -4.08               9.23
 
          (7.91)                             (10.84)                          (14.56) 
CSERVANT                          19.46                   19.92                            17.45 
                                                                 (13.07)                            (15.85)                         (27.19) 
HMANR_HH                        8.06                 6.41                                _   
 (9.61)                             (7.15)  
HMANR_SP                        -10.34                 -13.03                                _   
                                                                  (7.60)                             (12.51)                    
MAINROAD     - 0 . 3 2
**                            -0.3
***                                _              
                                                                 (0.15)                              (0.09)                   
DISTTOWN                  -0.08   
                           -0.09                     _     
                                                                 (0.12)      (0.17)                               
BSL_GOV                                                -0.04                               -0.01                              -0.28
* 
                                                                (0.08)                               (0.08)                            (0.17) 
ZONEIIa                   38.58                              44.9
*                     _ 
                                                                 (23.6)                               (23.55)                        
ZONEIIb                   -38.04       36.42                                 _ 
                                                                 (45.97)                            (38.91)                              
ZONEIII         20.01       27                                _ 
                                                                 (21.49)                            (23.96)                 
AF           -4.53      -4.88                         _ 
                                                                 (7.30)                              (9.57)           
AL           -11.14                 -13.23              _ 
                                                                 (9.89)                              (11.41)              35
HG          17.22        20.18                     _       
                                                                 (13.21)                              (21.78)                           
FV                      -11.9        -12.21                    _  
                                                                 (12.25)                              (16.28)                         
LR        -19.79
* 
                    -18.48                               _ 
                                                                 (11.51)                              (11.69)                       
YEAR2002     5.82          7.75         _   
                                                                 (6.12)                                 (6.39) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Estimated coefficients are marginal effects taking 




***) significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  
  Asset value has a positive effect in all three models. Estimation results from both 
pooled and random effects models indicate that cropland holding size has a positive 
effect but the effect decreases as the size increases, number of kids has a positive effect, 
and distance to main road has a negative effect. In contrast with the estimate from private 
channel fertilizer adoption models, number of kids becomes statistically significant in the 
level of adoption models according to the pooled and random effects estimates. One 
additional kid is associated with approximately 3 kgs more fertilizer purchased from the 
private sector. On the other hand, education and civil servant are longer significant as 
found in the adoption models. These findings justify our selection of double-hurdle 
model in analyzing fertilizer use behavior instead of Tobit model which can lead to 
inaccurate inferences due to the strong assumption.     
Government fertilizer programs BSL_GOV is negatively associated with the level 
of adoption in the fixed effects model. In the pooled and random effects models, the 
inability to control for relevant time-invariant omitted variables which are correlated with 
the government fertilizer programs provides a greater likelihood of biased estimates than 
in the fixed effects model. Time-varying omitted variables may be a problem in all three 
models. Thus it may be most appropriate to say that crowding out effect may range from 
being insignificant to significant, as indicated by the fixed effects estimates from the   36
adoption and level of adoption models. We estimate this effect and conduct simulations 
later in the paper to examine the magnitude of the crowding out effect, as a function of 
where government chooses to operate its distribution programs.  
We can interpret -0.28 on BSL_GOV as the following: each one kilogram per farm 
household increase in government fertilizer program in a rural SEA is associated with 
0.28 kilogram decrease in fertilizer purchased by a household from private retailers in 
that area, holding other factors constant.   
 
Crowding Out Effect 
We obtained estimates of the coefficient on the government program, BSL_GOV, using 
pooled, random effects and fixed effects models. Only estimates from fixed effects model 
are statistically significant and estimates from the other two models are not significantly 
different from zero. The fixed effects estimates are -0.0005 (α) and -0.28 (β) from probit 
and truncated regression respectively. Both are less than zero suggesting crowding out 
effect.  
Among the total 356 SEAs in the sample, during 1999/2000 government operated 
in 135 SEAs and private traders in 173 SEAs, and during 2002/03 these numbers become 
217 for government program and 195 for private retailers. In some areas both channels 
were found operating and the number of these areas is 100 for 1999/2000 and 139 for 
2002/2003. That is, among 135 SEAs where government program operated in 1999/2000, 
100 of them (74.1%) were areas where private retailers were also operating, and among 
217 SEAs where government distributed fertilizer in 2002/03, 139 of them (64.1%) were 
areas where private retailers were also operating.    37












information on the total number of farm households ni, number of households purchasing 
fertilizer from private sector n'i, and the average amount purchased by a household from 
private sector qi by equation (2) for those areas where both channels were operating for 
each period. Table 10 presents SEA-level minimum, median, maximum and average 
crowding out effect estimates for each of the two periods.       
Table 10: Estimates of Area-Specific Crowding Out Effects                                                                          
 Period                          minimum                 median                  maximum                average 
                                                                         
1999/2000                  0.996                      0.906                  0.689                        0.894 
                                                                        
2002/2003                  0.993                      0.921                  0.654                        0.899 
 
Maximum area-specific crowding out effect is approximately 0.6 and average 
crowding out effect is about 0.9 over the two periods. 











three scenarios. In the first scenario, government operates exclusively in areas where the 
crowding out effects are in the upper 50%. Government increases the volume it 
distributes in each of these areas by 1 ton. We use equation (3) to obtain results shown in 
Table 11.  
Table 11. Estimates of Crowding out Effect when Government Operates Exclusively 
in Areas (SEAs) in which the Crowding Out Effects are in the Upper 50%  
                                                                                                                            ∆Priv            ∆Total 
Period                 (∆Gov)i     Number of SEAs (k)       ∆Gov        ∆Priv             ∆Gov           ∆Gov                                
 
1999/2000        1 ton               87                          87          -16.14             -0.19           0.81                                 
                                                                                                
2002/2003        1 ton               98                          98          -17.64             -0.18           0.82        
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Results in Table 11 suggest that 1-ton increase in the volume of government 
fertilizer distributed in each of the SEAs where the crowding out effects are in the upper 
50% is associated with over 16-ton decrease in the aggregate volume procured from 
private sector in these areas. In the second scenario, government exclusively operates in 
all the areas where private retailers also operate in the sample and in the third scenario 
government operates in all the areas in the sample. Results are shown in Table 12 and 13 
respectively. 
Table 12. Estimates of Crowding out Effect when Government Operates Exclusively 
in Areas (SEAs) in which the Private Sector Operates in the Sample 
                                                                                                                            ∆Priv            ∆Total 
Period                 (∆Gov)i     Number of SEAs (k)       ∆Gov        ∆Priv             ∆Gov           ∆Gov                                
 
1999/2000        1 ton               173                         173         -20.24           -0.12           0.88                                 
                                                                                                
2002/2003        1 ton               195                         195         -22.17           -0.11           0.89        
 
  
Table 13.  Estimates of Crowding out Effect when Government Operates in all the 
Areas (SEAs) in the Sample 
                                                                                                                            ∆Priv            ∆Total 
Period                 (∆Gov)i     Number of SEAs (k)       ∆Gov        ∆Priv             ∆Gov           ∆Gov                                
 
1999/2000        1 ton               356                        356         -20.24           -0.06           0.94                                  
                                                                                                
2002/2003        1 ton               356                        356         -22.17           -0.06           0.94        
 
 
Magnitude of ∆Priv is larger in Scenario 2 than Scenario 1 because government 
program operates in more areas in which private retailers also operates in. However, the 
magnitude of crowding out effect is smaller in Scenario 2 than Scenario 1 due to the 





 caused by ∆Gov being much larger in 
Scenario 2 than Scenario 1.  Scenario 2 and 3 have the same ∆Priv because in Scenario 3 
government operates in additional areas where private retailers do not operate thus ∆Priv   39





 is the smallest in 





.                         
 
Conclusions 
Parallel input marketing channels, featuring government and private distribution channels 
are very common in developing countries.  There are concerns that government programs 
may undercut the development of commercial input distribution channels and thus cause 
unintended long-term consequences.  However, the magnitude of this effect has, as far as 
we know, never been quantified, and most studies estimating input demand do not take 
into account the possible interactions between actors in the parallel marketing channels. 
  This paper constructed household fertilizer use models and investigated 
household socioeconomic, demographic, market access, and agro-ecological factors 
affecting fertilizer adoption, and the level of adoption from alternative fertilizer 
marketing channels using nationally representative household panel survey data in 
Zambia.  We developed a method to measure the potential displacement, or crowding out, 
of private sector fertilizer sales resulting from government programs distributing 
subsidized fertilizer.  This paper contributes to the literature by developing a modeling 
framework for explicitly taking into account the effect of government input marketing 
programs on households’ fertilizer procurement from private sector and then provides 
empirical estimates of the crowding out effect and conducts simulation analyses under 
three alternative scenarios about government’s selection of areas for its distribution 
programs.    40
According to the survey, less than 20% of households used fertilizer from either 
channel, although there is a slight increase in the percentage for each channel in the latter 
year. We found that the household attributes most important in explaining whether they 
buy from private retailers are, with few exceptions, the same variables correlated with 
acquisition of fertilizer from government programs.  These attributes include the value of 
household assets, farm size, male-headed households, educational attainment of the 
household head, households containing a civil service employee, and relative proximity 
to district towns and road infrastructure.  The correlation between these variables and 
households purchasing inputs on a commercial basis is not surprising – in poor areas, 
input purchase is likely to be highly correlated with household purchasing power. But the 
fact that these same variables are equally correlated with receipt of subsidized fertilizer 
from government is quite surprising, because it suggests that the treasury costs of 
subsidized fertilizer distribution are being captured disproportionally by relatively 
wealthy smallholder farmers in relatively accessible areas, in contrast to stated 
government objectives for the fertilizer subsidy program.   
Econometric analyses of fertilizer adoption from each channel reveal positive 
effects of asset value and cropland holding size, indicating household economic status is 
an important factor influencing both government targeting of fertilizer and households’ 
decision to purchase fertilizer from private channel. Education, which is a proxy for 
knowledge and skill is also found to be positively related to fertilizer acquisition from 
both government and private sector channels.  Age and education of the household head, 
and number of male adults being significant and all having positive signs in the 
government channel fertilizer adoption model suggests that the more educated, the older,   41
and a larger household size with more male adults is more likely to be targeted by the 
government probably because these households are politically more influential than 
others.  Having a civil servant in the household is positively related to the probability of 
procuring fertilizer from private suppliers and government program distributing fertilizer 
in the area is negatively associated with this probability. The results also indicate that 
government tends to target fertilizer distribution disproportionately in areas with 
relatively productive soil types and agro-ecological potential 
A different set of factors are found significant in the level of adoption models for 
both channels than in the corresponding adoption models, which suggests use of double-
hurdle models is more appropriate than Tobit models in analyzing fertilizer use. 
Econometric analysis of the extent of fertilizer adoption from government channel 
indicates positive association with household asset value, farm size, number of female 
adults and kids, and negative effects of the square term of cropland size, female-headed 
household and death of other adult member. Household asset value, cropland holding size 
and number of kids are also significant factors positively influencing the quantity of 
fertilizer purchased from private channel.  Square term of cropland holding size is 
significant and has a negative sign suggesting quantity of fertilizer procured increases 
with the cropland size but at a decreasing rate. Farther distance to the main road and 
government targeting more fertilizer in the area both reduce the quantity purchased from 
private traders.  
Coefficient estimates on the government fertilizer program are statistically 
significant and negative from the fixed effects models suggesting crowding out effect. 
Based on such estimates we derived average crowding out effect to be approximately 0.9.   42
Simulation study shows that crowding out effect due to increase in the volume of 
fertilizer distributed by government in SEAs critically depends on which SEAs and the 
number of SEAs included in the government program. 
Empirical results from this study suggest that government programs distributing 
subsidized fertilizer may significantly reduce the probability and quantity of fertilizer 
procured from private suppliers. In addition, households that received government 
program fertilizer are more likely to purchase fertilizer from private sector than non-users 
in the absence of government programs. Thus in order to enhance small farmer income 
through increased fertilizer use and thereby productivity, households that have less 
capability to bear risks should be emphasized by government programs. Furthermore, 
government programs may be more effective if they target areas where the private sector 
is not already active, and where lack of knowledge and extension problems may provide 
opportunities for subsidized distribution to facilitate learning so as to expand the 
commercial demand for fertilizer over time.  This may require appropriate management 
extension, small-pack distribution, and complementary investments in physical 
infrastructure and transport logistics so that fertilizer use can be made to be more 
profitable for farmers, introduce fertilizer in areas where fertilizer use is most likely to be 
profitable. To increase the incentives of private traders in participating in the fertilizer 
market, the quantity of fertilizer distributed by government should be reduced and 
reallocate scarce resources to improve both the quantity and quality of extension service 
to farmers.  
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Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1 The geographic unit of analysis is the Standard Enumeration Area (SEA), which is the 
most disaggregated geographic unit in the data.  In Zambia, an SEA many include 2-4 
villages of several thousand people.   
 
2 This paper only reports estimation results for basal fertilizer use. Results for top 
dressing are very similar to those for basal fertilizer because households tend to use them 
at the predominant ratio 1:1. 